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EMINENT DOMAIN: RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA'S
ILLUSORY SOLUTION TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
Christine J. De Leon*
I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2007, America was in the thick of the worst economic period since
the Great Depression, a period the press called the Great Recession.2 A steep decline
in America's gross domestic product and precipitous uptick in joblessness shook the
nation.3 In 2007, approximately 1.7 million homes entered into foreclosure.4 In
2008, there were over 2 million foreclosure filings.5 During the next four years, that
number continued to grow,6 and one in five U.S. mortgages remained underwater
into 2013.7 California holds the dubious honor of housing multiple metropolitan
areas hard-hit by the foreclosure crisis.8 In 2012, Riverside, California had the fifth
most foreclosures and the second largest decline in home prices in the country, while
home prices in Sacramento, California dropped more than fifty percent.9 Further
exacerbating the foreclosure and home value problem, private bondholders holding
the mortgages were either unwilling or unable to renegotiate the terms of the loans
with the homeowners,10 leaving them to slowly but surely dig themselves into deeper
and deeper holes of debt.
* Christine J. De Leon
1. E.g., Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.
2. See Catherine Rampell. 'Great Recession': A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar.
11 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/1 1/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/.
3. Id.; see generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(2011) available at http://fcic-static.1aw.stanford.edulcdn-media/fcic-reports/fcic final report fiull.pdf.
4. Mortgage Loss Mitigation Statistics: Industry Extrapolations, HOPE Now (2009) (Quarterly for
2007 and 2008), available at http://www.hopenow.com/industry-
data/HOPE%20NOW%2ONational%2Data%2JulyO7%20to%2OJunO9%20v2.pdf.
5. Id.
6. See Home Foreclosure Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/.
7. Tim Reid, Calfornia city becomes first to adopt eminent domain plan, CNBC (Jul. 30, 2013),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100926221.
8. Isaac Brekken, Cities with the Most Homes in Foreclosure, NBC NEWS (May 26, 2012),
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/cities-most-homes-foreclosure-794509 (Sacramento, California was 12th in
home foreclosures and 5th in home price decline, while Riverside, California was 5th in home foreclosures and
2nd in home price decline).
9. Id.
10. Amir Sufi, Seizures May be Cities' Last Hope in Mortgage Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 18, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/Print/2012-07-18/seizures-may-be-cities-last-hope-in-mortgage-crisis.html;
see also, David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principal in State Property Law,
77 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 98 (2010).
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Foreclosures can dramatically decrease the value of a home, and serve as a
dependable forewarning of a housing crisis." Decreases in home values combined
with increasing mortgage debt leads to near-negative or negative equity. 12 Negative
equity, also known as an underwater mortgage, is when the homeowner owes more
money on his mortgage than the home is worth.' 3 Reduction in home value reflects
factors such as the home's disrepair, the lenders' attempt to sell the home as quickly
as possible, and especially in situations such as foreclosure crises, the excess supply
of homes. 14 Further, the foreclosures themselves reduce a home's value by a larger
margin than other type of forced sales.15
Although rising foreclosure rates have affected the entire nation, some states
have been particularly affected. Whilst California has reduced the annual foreclosure
filings to its lowest rate since 2007,16 its volume of foreclosures has remained among
the highest nationwide.' 7 And although the national foreclosure rate is "more than
halfway back to normal,"' 8 the seven American cities with the highest foreclosure
rates in September 2012 are within California's borders.19
The housing crisis remains, despite of improvements in foreclosure rates. In
September 2012, the nation reached its lowest foreclosure numbers since July 2007.20
In the first quarter of 2012, 11.4 million mortgages were underwater, down over two
percent from the previous year.21 Those numbers have continued to decline; and as
of 2013, 10.4 million homeowners were underwater on their mortgages, 22 and
foreclosures in California were down twenty-nine percent in 2012 from the previous
11. Daniel Hartley, The Impact of Foreclosures on the Housing Market, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-15.cfin.
12. See CoreLogic Reports Negative Equity Decreases in First Quarter of 2012, CORELOGIC (July 12,
2012), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic-reports-negative-equity-decreases-in-first-quarter-
of-2012.aspx [hereinafter CORELOGIC, Negative Equity Decreases].
13. Id.
14. Id; see also Mary Gallagher, How Foreclosures Affect Housing Prices, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/foreclosures-affect-housing-prices-8984.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
15. Patti Richards, How Foreclosures Hurt Everyone's Home Values, MIT MEDIA RELATIONS (July 20,
2010), http://web.mit.edu/press/2010/housing-prices.html (foreclosures reduced the value of a home by an
average of 27% while other types of forced sales, such as bankruptcy, only reduced the home's value by 3-7%).
16. See, e.g., Calfornia Foreclosure Activity Lowest Since Early 2007, DQ NEws (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.dqnews.com/Articles/2012/News/Califomia/CA-Foreclosures/RRForl21017.aspx (low reached in
2012); RealtyTrac Staff, Foreclosure Activity Drops to a 5-Year Low in September, REALTYTRAC (Oct. 9,
2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/september-and-q3-2012-us-foreclosure-
market-report-7424 (foreclosure starts in California have decreased by 45% from the previous year, reaching a
69-month low, but still ranked amongst the top three states in the month and quarter)[hereinafter REALTYTRAC,
5-year low].
17. See e.g., California Foreclosure Rate Tops In Nation; San Leandro Family's Struggle Typical, CBS
LOCAL: SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA (July 12, 2012), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/07/12/califomia-
foreclosure-rate-tops-in-nation-san-leandro-familys-struggle-typicall.
18. Susanna Kim, Top 10 Metro Areas with the Highest Foreclosure Rates, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/top-10-metropolitan-areas-highest-foreclosure-
rates/story?id=17556494#.ULMgM6WYXUk (quoting Daren Blomquist, Vice President at RealtyTrac).
19. Id (Stockton, California had the worst rate of one in every 67 homes in foreclosure).
20. REALTYTRAC, 5-year low, supra note 16.
21. CORELOGIC, Negative Equity Decreases, supra note 12.
22. Matthew Goldstein, Eminent domain to fix troubled mortgages makes a Cabf comeback, CNBC (Apr.
16, 2013, 12:39 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100646504.
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year.23 Notwithstanding these improvements, high foreclosure rates continue to pose
a special problem for local governments. In addition to the lost property tax
revenue, 24 foreclosures often lead to abandoned homes and vacant properties. 25
When concentrated, those vacant properties may act as a setting for illicit activity
such as drug use and distribution, squatting, prostitution, and theft.26 Concentrated
foreclosures also affect the surrounding area, reducing the property value of
neighboring homes not yet in foreclosure.27 Local governments must also respond
by increasing expenditures to secure the newly vacant homes, raise police and fire
protection, redevelop blighted areas, and provide social programs meant to address
homelessness, job loss, and educational needs due to foreclosure.28 Furthermore, the
costs associated with the legal or administrative systems processing the foreclosures
themselves add to the local economy's burden.29 After recognizing the repercussions
of foreclosures, the government has attempted to remedy the housing crisis and
mitigate the ominous foreclosure rates through various plans.
One novel proposal requires local governments to use their eminent domain
power and has initiated debate in municipalities across the nation. Traditionally,
eminent domain has been used to forcibly acquire privately owned real property for
public use. 30 In San Bernardino County in California, the local government teamed
with a private community advisory firm and proposed using its eminent domain
power to help distressed homeowners with their underwater mortgages by seizing
those mortgages and restructuring them.31 With decreased principals on the loans,
the homeowners would then make lower mortgage payments while staying in their
homes.32  Other cities experiencing especially troubled housing markets, such as
23. RealtyTrac Staff, 1.8 Million US. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2012, REALTYTRAC (Jan.
14, 2013) http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2012-year-end-foreclosure-market-
report-7547.
24. See Ellen Schloemer et al., Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the
Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners 24 (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/FC-paper-12-19-new-cover-1.pdf.
25. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs ofForeclosure: The Impact of Single-Family
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 Housing Pol'y Debate 57, 57 (2006).
26. Id. at 59.
27. Id. at 57. The Fannie Mae Foundation administered a case study on Chicago, Illinois and determined
each foreclosure reduces the value of each single-family home within an eighth of a mile by an average of one
percent. Id at 58. A second study of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania revealed similar results. Anne B. Shlay &
Gordon Whitman, Research for Democracy: Linking Community Organizing and Research to Leverage Blight
Policy 20 (2004), available at http:// comm-org.wisc.edu/paper2004/shlay/shlay.htm.
28. See William C. Apgar et al., Homeowner Preservation Found., The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures:
A Chicago Case Study 20-29 (2005),
http:// www.995hope.org/content/pdf/ApgarDuda StudyFullVersion.pdf; see also Immergluck & Smith,
supra note 25, at 58-59.
29. John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of The Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV.
629, 645 (2008).
30. See e.g., Rebecca Leung, Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:28 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-575343.html.
31. E.g., Anna Cuevas, Is Eminent Domain to Seize Mortgages the Solution to California's High
Foreclosure Problem?, HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 08, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anna-
cuevas/eminent-domain-mortgages-califomia-b1754519.html.
32. Melissa Griffin, Could Cahfornia Use Eminent Domain to Save Troubled Mortgages?, CBS (July 30,
2012, 12:50 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/07/30/melissa-griffin-could-california-use-eminent-
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Chicago, Illinois, are considering similar plans.33 Despite the suggested benefits,
Chicago's mayor, Rahm Emanuel,34 federal agencies,35 and President Barack
Obama 36 have opposed plans like the one proposed by San Bernardino County. San
Bernardino County took months of fierce resistance to heart and shelved the proposal
in January 2013.37
Despite San Bernardino County's decision to forego the eminent domain
program, the city of Richmond, California, quickly became one of the program's
strongest advocates.3 8 Gayle McLaughlin, Richmond's mayor, teamed with a private
community advisory firm to implement the program. 39 The mayor professes she is
"very committed to th[e] program" and the "well-being of [Richmond's]
neighborhoods."40 As of the contract's signing in July 2013, approximately half the
mortgages in Richmond were underwater.41 Most Richmond councilmembers,
frustrated by the lack of federal help and relief from the Obama administration,
consider eminent domain their most viable option for relief.42 The current debate
regarding Richmond's proposed use of eminent domain will surely affect the scope
of eminent domain use in the future, and in other troubled municipalities throughout
the nation.
This Note argues that although mortgages do constitute "property" for takings
purposes, using eminent domain in order to provide homeowners with more
affordable mortgages in hopes of stimulating the economy and housing market would
violate federal and California law and would be bad policy. Part I of this Note will
give a basic description of the mortgage structure and its development into its current
state. Part II will discuss the city of Richmond's proposed use of eminent domain in
more detail. Part III will discuss the proposal's legality; including whether a mortgage
qualifies as "property" (Part III.A.), whether replacing the loan with a more
affordable option is a "public use" (Part III.B.), and whether the mortgage owners
domain-to-save-troubled-mortgages/.
33. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Mortgages and eminent domain: May they never meet, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Aug. 03, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-03/news/ct-perspec-0803-domain-20120803 1 eminent-domain-
mortgages-original-lenders (Mayor Rahm Emanuel as well as two Chicago alderman initially showed interest
in the plan); Mary Ellen Podmolik, Federal agency questions plan to seize underwater mortgages, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 09, 2012), http://articles/chicagotribune.com/2012-08-09/business/ct-biz-0809-eminent-
domain-20120809 1_underwater-mortgages-eminent-domain-freedie-mac.
34. Podmolik, supra note 32 (Mayor Emanuel told reporters he does not think it is in "the power of the
city to do").
35. Id. (the Federal Housing Finance Agency opine that the cost of this plan would ultimately fall on the
taxpayers).
36. Griffin, supra note 32.
37. Goldstein, supra note 22.
38. Kent McDill, Municipalities to Use Eminent Domain to Prevent Foreclosures, Save Neighborhoods,
SPECTREM'S MILLIONAIRE CORNER (Jul. 30, 2013), http://www.millionairecorner.com/article/municipalities-
use-eminent-domain-prevent-foreclosures-save-neighborhoods.
39. Advisory Services Agreement, CITY OF RICHMOND (July 21, 2013), available at
www.ci.richmond.ca.us/documentcenter/view/27354.
40. Shaila Dewan, A city invokes seizure laws to save homes, CNBC (Jul. 30, 2013, 1:06 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100924656.
4 1. Id
42. Id.
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would be justly compensated (Part III.C.). Part IV will discuss the policy arguments
for and against Richmond's proposed use of eminent domain. Part V concludes and
encourages municipalities throughout the nation to set proposals like Richmond's
aside.
II. MORTGAGE STRUCTURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
Simply put, a mortgage is a "type of loan that is secured by real estate."a' This
type of contract conveys the conditional right of ownership of property to the lender
as security or collateral for the loan." The lender has the right to take the home if
the owner is unable to meet his mortgage obligation. The lender's security interest
is voided once the loan is repaid and the borrower's obligation is met.45 The borrower
pays not only the principal, or amount of the original loan, but also interest on the
principal.46
Once a homeowner obtains a mortgage, the investment bank is able to purchase
the mortgage from the original lender.47 The original lender sells its security interest
in order to obtain payments sooner, and ensure that their investment is returned.48
The investment bank purchasing mortgages essentially becomes the homeowners'
lender,49 the security interest is then transferred to the investment bank, and the
homeowner is indebted to the investment bank instead of the original lender.50
For example, if the borrower owes a lender a principal amount of $100 with a
20% interest rate on a gold necklace, the lender may sell that loan to an investment
bank for $110. The lender is then guaranteed his original investment of $100 plus a
profit. The investment bank now holds the loan and stands to obtain the extra $10
from interest, depending on whether the borrower makes his payments. The
investment bank, in the event that the borrower does not make his payments, has the
right to take the necklace and sell it. The amount the investment bank gets in return
after exercising its security interest rights depends on the necklace's value at the time
of the sale, which can be less than the amount of the original loan ($120). The
investment bank, having to seize the collateral property due to the borrower's default
on payments can then suffer a loss or gain, depending on the property's value at the
time. This system allows the borrower to obtain property without paying the full cost
43. Know Your Options, Mortgage Basics, FANNIE MAE: KNow YOUR OPTIONS,
http://knowyouroptions.com/buy/buying-process/qualify-for-a-mortgage/mortgage-basics (last visited Feb. 1,
2014).
44. Id.
45. Security Interest, BUSINESS DICTIONARY (2013),
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/security-interest.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
46. Know Your Options, supra note 43.
47. Sal Khan, Collateralized Debt Obligation Overview, Khan Academy (Jul. 20, 2011),
http://www.khanacademy.org/science/core-finance/derivative-securities/CDO-tutorial/v/collateralized-debt-
obligation-overview.
48. Deb Powers, Simple Explanation of Mortgage Backed Securities And How They Contributed to the
Economic Crisis, YAHOO! VOICES (Oct. 8, 2008), http://voices.yahoo.com/simple-explanation-mortgage-
backed-securities-and-1975646.html.
49. Id.
5 0. Id.
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up front, the original lender to secure repayment of his loan amount with profit, and
the investment bank to receive at least the property's value and potentially the amount
of the original loan plus interest. Because the original lender's original expense is
repaid by the investment bank for more than the original lender paid, this system
allows the original lender to sell as many loans as it can while gaining profit,
regardless of the borrower's repayments.
Similar to the original lender, investment banks are also able to sell its mortgages.
Investment banks may then put those mortgages into a special purposes entity (SPE),
apportion those SPEs into shares, and sell those shares as mortgage backed securities
(MBSs).5 Relying on the assumption that home prices would continue to rise, the
investment banks created the SPEs and sold the MBS shares at increasing rates with
little consideration of repayment issues.52 Between 2000 and 2006, home prices rose
at an average rate triple that of the decade prior.53 In 2005, the rate of increase hit a
high of 21%.54
While creating the SPEs and MBSs, the investment banks soon developed a
process called "tranching." These entities pooled the mortgages, securitized55 them,
then divided each pool into three groups called tranches.56 The entities then rated
each tranche based on its credit-risk from lowest to highest: senior, intermediate or
mezzanine, and junior.57 Once mortgages are paid back, investors are reimbursed in
order of their credit-risk rating: senior, then mezzanine, then junior tranches.58 Lower
tranches are typically re-securitized through collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs).59 The lower tranches backed by CMOs are then pooled, securitized, and
tranched in the same way as the original loans. 60 This process gives countless third
parties a financial stake in the underlying mortgages, how they are paid, and how
they are modified6' creating a "complex web of arrangements."62 As if the web was
51. See Khan, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. James R. Barth et. al., The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets: Buildup and
Meltdown of the Mortgage and Credit Markets 8 (Jan. 2009) (unpublished document), available at
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/riseandfallexcerpt.pdf.
55. To securitize is to turn assets into securities, or financial instruments readily bought and sold in
financial markets similar to stocks. Cam Merritt, What is the meaning of securitization? SFGATE
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/meaning-securitization-6615.html (last visited July 31, 2013).
56. Harvard Law Review Association, The Perils ofFragmentation and Reckless Innovation, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1799, 1803 (2012); see also, Dana, supra note 10, at 103.
57. Dana, supra note 10.
58. Id.
59. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION,
MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 1 (Mar 6, 2009), available at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010739/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-
report.pdf ("Oversight Report"); see also Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts:
Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1098-1102 (2009);
Joshua D. Coval, et al., The Economics of Structured Finance 10-15 (Harvard Business School Working Paper
No 09-060, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-060.pdf.
60. See Dana, supra note 10, at 103.
61. Id.
62. Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 669-84 (2012).
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not complicated enough, borrowers often take out second mortgages held by
investors unrelated to the first but fragmented and securitized in the same way.63
Although mortgages are incredibly useful in that they provide a means of
purchasing a home without having to pay upfront, the sudden increase in mortgages
is one of the key causes of the Great Recession.6" The problem, more specifically,
was the push for home-ownership, i.e. giving home-ownership opportunities to
individuals traditionally unable to qualify.65 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
government sponsored entities, sought to help lower-income borrowers otherwise
unable to qualify for mortgages to buy homes.66 High-risk, low-income borrowers
were able to obtain mortgages, specifically adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), 67
which allowed borrowers to refinance their loans in order to meet their payments.68
However, this model of refinancing to avoid the ARM rate increase is significantly
reliant on home value's continued appreciation. 69  The flood of new borrowers,
higher demand, and the previous decade's increase in home value have made
investors and potential borrowers believe in a promising future.70  As a result,
mortgage lenders sold to as many people as they could 7 but more interest rates rose
and the influx of low-income ARM borrowers evolved into the influx of loan
defaults. 72
63. The multiple layers of tranching coupled with multiple mortgages associated with the same property
may create issues in regards to identifying investors, their entitlements, and the ultimate effects of each
additional tranche on the investors or the original mortgage. The difficult question of who, if any one person
or entity, has clear title of the seized property becomes further complicated. Although important issues, these
concerns are beyond the scope of this Note. See Dana, supra note 10, at 103.
64. See e.g., Stephen Rose, Understanding the Financial Crisis, STATS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://stats.org/stories/2008/understanding financial-crisissept28_2008.html.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 48.
67. Adjustable-rate mortgages differ from fixed-rate mortgages. Fixed-rate mortgages require the
borrower to pay an interest rate that remains constant every year. In comparison, an adjustable-rate mortgage
requires the borrower to abide by an interest rate that changes periodically. Board of Governors of The Federal
Reserve Board, What is an ARAP: Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 4 (last visited July 31,
2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201204_CFPBARMs-brochure.pdf When and how the
rate changes differ, however, a typical program would offer a lower interest rate in earlier years. As long as the
home prices continue to rise, the homeowner has the option to refinance his home and obtain a mortgage on the
remaining balance with a lower interest rate. The problem these homeowners with adjustable-rate mortgages
faced prior to and during the Great Recession was the decline in home values and their inability to refinance
their mortgages. Due to the higher interest rates, these homeowners were unable to make their payments and
foreclosure rates rose. Barth, supra note 54 at 10.
68. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L.
REv. 549, 550-51 (2009).
69. Id. at 551.
70. See, e.g., Episode 355: The Giant Pool of Money, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (May 9, 2008),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/transcript.
71. Rose, supra note 64.
72. Christopher J. Mayer, et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 2 (Finance & Economics Discussion
Series, Division of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.,
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf (as the higher
interest rates on ARMs kicked in low-income, high-risk borrowers were unable to meet payments, defaulting
on their loans).
2013-14] 197
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III. RICHMOND AND MRP's PROPOSAL
In early 2011, a group of politically connected venture capitalists formed
Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP) in San Francisco, California. MRP sought to
advance one of the proposed solutions to the housing crisis: using eminent domain to
seize underwater mortgages and replace those mortgages with more affordable
ones.73 This self-styled "community advisory firm," 74 originally planned to raise
money from private investors to purchase the underwater mortgages for a fair value,
allowing the homeowners bound by those mortgages to avoid potential foreclosure
and remain in their homes.75  This process would reduce homeowners' mortgage
principals and assign the reduced monthly payments to MRP.76 MRP's executive
chairman Phil Angelides vehemently supported this proposal, projecting that MRP
and its investors "just might do a good thing for America, and along the way get a
great return on investment." 77  As a former State Treasurer and Democratic
gubernatorial candidate for California,78 Angelides hoped to use "legal and political
leverage," as well as claims of up to 20% annual returns for investors, to secure
private funds. 79 Executive Chairman Angelides also assured potential investors that
if losses occurred they would likely be deductible for tax purposes.8o Despite
Angelides' enthusiastic support, he withdrew from MRP less than a month after
announcing his involvement. 81
MRP's plan to use eminent domain to seize underwater mortgages was
developed after it became clear that the mortgage contracts barred voluntary sale to
private investors.82 To overcome this hurdle, MRP revised its plan to enlist local
governments to use their eminent domain power to seize the mortgages. 83
While MRP has been clear in its plan's overall purpose of reducing the risk of
foreclosures, they have been alarmingly vague with regard to the details of the plan
itself. MRP has demonstrated a failure to develop concrete goals for the eminent
domain plan by periodically releasing contradicting proposals for the plan's
implementation. 84 Graham Williams, CEO of MRP, acknowledged this issue when
73. Jennifer Ablan & Matthew Goldstein, Exclusive: Angelides to lead distressed mortgagefirm, REUTERS
(Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-usa-housing-angelides-idUSTRE80C26820120113 [hereinafter,
Angelides to lead].
74. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS WEBSITE, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com (last visited
July 31, 2013).
75. Angelides to lead, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Angelides to lead, supra note 73.
80. Id.
81. Jennifer Ablan & Matthew Goldstein, Financial crisis chair Angelides quits mortgage firm, REUTERS
(Feb. 13, 2012, 5:15pm EST),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-mortgages-angelides-idUSTRE81 C20A20120213.
82. FAQs, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/faqs (last visited
July 31, 2013).
83. Id.
84. See e.g., Griffin, supra note 32 (stating the eligible mortgages must be underwater and the mortgagor
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he warned the Federal Housing Finance Agency in late 2012 that any action against
their proposal would be premature, given the plan had not yet been fully formulated.8 5
Accordingly, the information MRP has presented do not provide sufficient details
regarding eligibility for the plan or the mortgage selection process, reasons for
preferring up-to-date mortgages over those more at risk of foreclosure, whether a
threshold of negative equity exists for eligibility, nor whether the investors or the
original lenders are deemed the mortgagees. Despite the current holes in MPR's
eminent domain plan, the following is an aggregation of what can be ascertained from
the available information on MRP's current proposal.
MRP's aspirations are to earn a profit 86 and prevent foreclosures by using local
governments' eminent domain power to seize mortgages, transfer these mortgages to
the local government, and restructure the mortgages, enabling the mortgagors to
make lower monthly payments to MRP.87 As opposed to a traditional eminent
domain taking, the property seized would be the loan and not the home itself.8 8 The
homeowner would stay in her home and, the local government would then own the
homeowner's mortgage. 89
The first step to implementing MRP's proposal is to identify which homeowners
and loans meet the proposal's requirements.9 The mortgages in consideration need
not secure property from any particular neighborhood or concentrated area, but must
be the homeowner's primary residence.91 The loan must have a higher remaining
balance than the fair market value of the mortgaged property, or be considered
"underwater." 92 In order to be eligible homeowners must also be current on their
loan payments.93  Finally, MRP aims to limit the option to private loans to avoid
conflicts between state and federal authorities.94 For example, the Federal Housing
Finance Agency has threatened to bring legal action against the state or local
governments that implement this type of proposal or restrict business activities with
must be current on his or her payments); see also Joe Nelson, Underwater mortgage acquisition proposal
expands to include delinquent or defaulted homeowners, SAN BERNITO COUNTY SUN (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.sbsun.com/news/ci_21482566/underwater-mortgage-acquisition-proposal-expands-include-
delinquent-or (stating defaulted or delinquent mortgagors will qualify for the proposal); but see Center for
American Progress: Eminent Domain and the Housing Market (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 8, 2013),
available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/310257-1 (proposal opponents criticized the proposal for
disqualifying defaulted mortgagors and Steven Gluckstern of MRP failed to contest the disqualification).
85. Letter from Graham Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Mortgage Resolution Partners, to Alfred
Pollard, General Counsel, Federal Housing Finance Agency (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/sites/default/files/attachments/fhfa-commentletter_9.7.12.pdf
[hereinafter, Letter from Williams].
86. See Center for American Progress, supra note 84 (Chairman of MRP Steven Gluckstern describes
MRP as a profit-seeking organization).
87. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS WEBSITE, supra note 74; see also Centerfor American Progress,
supra note 84.
88. See Center for American Progress, supra note 84 (MRP Chairman description of the proposal).
89. FAQs, supra note 82.
90. Id.
91. Griffin, supra note 32; Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
92. Griffin, supra note 32; Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
93. Griffin, supra note 32; Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
94. See Letter from Williams, supra note 85.
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jurisdictions that implement this type of plan.95
After establishing which homeowners are eligible for this benefit, the local
government is able to choose eligible mortgages, although it is unclear who
ultimately selects the mortgages for the proposal.96 If the owners of the mortgages
choose not to sell their loans to the local government, MRP can then use eminent
domain to seize the mortgages and pay fair market value for the loans.97 The criterion
governing the investors' decision-making process has yet to be detailed, resulting in
a lack of definitive requirements for eligibility and opens questions as to the fairness
of the program's application.98
Finally, the loans would be restructured, thus providing more affordable options
for the homeowners. 99 The local government would work with MRP to determine
the fair market value, or the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, of the
loan in consideration.100 MRP proposes to use appraisersol as well as the Federal
Housing Finance Agency's valuations to determine fair value of the loans.102 After
determining the fair market value of the loans, the owners of the loans may contest
the amount via jury trial. 103 The local government would then pay the determined
fair market value to the original lenders using investor funding, transferring the right
to the homeowner's future loan payments from the original lenders to MRP
investors. 104 The result is the homeowner paying lower mortgage payments to MRP
that represent the actual value of the loan105 and, hopefully, protecting the
homeowner from foreclosure. 0 6
The proposal utilizes funding from MRP investors to seize the homeowners'
mortgages and replace them with loans based on the homes' updated fair market
value.' 07 The mortgagees then pay their new mortgage payments to MRP at rates
lower than their previous mortgage but above the fair market value of the loans. 08
95. FHFA Statement on Eminent Domain, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY (Aug. 8, 2013),
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25419/FHFAStmtEminentDomainO8O8l3.pdf.
96. Griffin, supra note 32.
97. See Letter from Williams, supra note 85; see also FAQs, supra note 82; see also Center for American
Progress, supra note 84.
98. See Center for American Progress, supra note 84 (Jim Carr, Senior Policy Fellow with Opportunity
Agenda urged during the panel discussion that although the proposal can be successful, the plan is flawed due
to unclear homeowner qualifications and implementation procedures).
99. Id.
100. FAQs, supra note 82; see also Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
101. Letter from Williams, supra note 85.
102. Gluckstern Comment, MRP Releases Comment Letter to the FHFA on Eminent Domain, MORTGAGE
RESOLUTION PARTNERS WEBSITE, http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/mrp-releases-comment-letter-to-the-
fhfa-on-eminent-domain (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
103. See Centerfor American Progress, supra note 84; CAL. CONST. art. I §19(a).
104. Because MRP will use the fair market value of the property, MRP will not be required to negotiate
values with the original lenders. Furthermore, the original lenders have a right to contest the fair market value
by way of trial. FAQs, supra note 82; Griffin, supra note 32.
105. Griffin, supra note 32.
106. FAQs, supra note 82.
107. FAQs, supra note 82.
108. Center for American Progress, supra note 84 (amount above fair value accounting for payments to
MRP and private investors).
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With each payment, MRP takes a fee before transferring the rest to its private
investors. 109 Although this is the financing structure MRP illustrates, MRP also
indicates the local government pays the fair value for the taken loans.110 MRP claims
the community does not finance the firm, a "funder" does, yet who the "funder" is
precisely remains unclear.1II
Additional details have surfaced in light of RP's recent contract with
Richmond, California. Richmond has already implemented the first step of its plan,
to send letters to owners of underwater mortgages offering to buy their loans.112 Each
of the eligible loans is either current or delinquent and tied to private label
securities. 113 The city has offered to purchase each homeowner's mortgage for 80%
of the home's fair market value. 114 In its next step the city will likely write down the
debt, enabling the homeowners to refinance through a government-lending
program." 5 The city will not have the need to utilize its eminent domain power to
condemn and buy the loans unless the owners of the loan reject the city's offer to
purchase the loans.116 MRP's role is to assist the city in negotiating with "owners of
loans, attorneys, lenders, data companies, other government agencies, and others as
necessary to implement [the] program."117 Most importantly, MRP is responsible for
identifying companies willing to fund the program.' 18 Added details in Richmond's
plan have shed some light on the proposal, however still do not clarify specifics
regarding eligibility, the selection process, or negative equity thresholds.
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN
For a taking of private property to be legitimate, the object of the taking must be
"property," the property must be taken for public use, and the government entity must
provide just compensation for that property.1 9 This section addresses whether local
governments have the legal authority to implement a proposal such as MRP's, more
specifically, whether MRP is able to seize the loans for its proposed purpose. Since
no statute or case has specifically endorsed the idea of using eminent domain to seize
a loan, several state statutes as well as federal authorities must be considered in
109. FAQs, supra note 82.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Issues, such as those MRP originally encountered, arise in regarding voluntary sales in the original
mortgage contracts' language. Although whether the contracts allow voluntary sale of the loans is an important
factor for the proposal's implementation, the answer is indeterminable and beyond the scope of this Note. See
also McDill, supra note 38.
113. Private label securities are those pooled and sold to private investors. See Dewan, supra note 40. This
type of security does not conform to government-required criteria and carries much higher risks. See, e.g.,
Private-Label MBS: Understanding Mortgage Securitization, SECURITIZATION,
http://securitization.weebly.com/private-label-mbs.html (last visited Jul. 31, 2013).
114. McDill, supra note 38; Dewan, supra note 40.
115. McDill, supra note 38.
116. Id.
117. Advisory Services Agreement, supra note 39, at 1.
118. Id. at 2.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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evaluating the legality of the eminent domain portion of MRP's proposal. 120
Subsection A discusses qualifications for "property" in the legal sense. Subsection
B discusses conditions for "public use" under federal and California law. Finally,
Subsection C discusses the requirements for just compensation.
A. Are Mortgages Considered "Property? "
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
declares "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."' 21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment binds all
states to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment.122 All state constitutions, except
North Carolina, include a takings clause that emulates that of the federal version. 123
In terms of the Takings Clause, "property" means a bundle of rights associated with
the person's relation to the physical object, such as the right to possess, use and
dispose of the object, and includes nearly all interests the citizen may possess in that
object. 124 Traditionally takings involved only land-use regulations,125 but over time
private property has included tangible as well as intangible property, such as leases,
trade secrets, and security interests. 126  Like the Fifth Amendment, California's
Eminent Domain Law1 27 applies to "property and any interest therein," 28 even
including property rights related to a professional football team. 129 Whether taken
property qualifies as "property" under the Fifth Amendment is seemingly
uncontested, so it is unnecessary to provide extensive analysis on the issue. 130
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has already determined that security interests
constitute "property."' 31 Therefore, security interests such as mortgages are
considered property.
B. "Public Use"
Throughout eminent domain's history, courts have generally adopted two
120. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (describing the government's "physical"
occupation of an owner's property as a defacto taking).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
122. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
123. 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 1-95 (Julius Sackman ed., 3d
ed. 2001).
124. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (includes all interest besides collateral
interests incident to the citizen's relation to the object).
125. Id
126. Id. (lease); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets); United States
v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (security interest).
127. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170 (West 2007).
128. Id
129. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
130. Contracts are well established in federal case law as property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Omnia Commercial Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923); Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
131. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70.
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dominant views regarding "public use."132 The first is the broad view, describing
"public use" as an advantage or benefit to the public.133 The second is the narrow
view, meaning the public's actual use or right to use the condemned property.134 if
the public owns, controls, and can use the property, then it qualifies as a public use.135
The remarkably different interpretations at all levels of the federal judiciary have
caused confusion on the state court level.136  This part attempts to analyze the
disparate holdings to conceptualize a public use framework under which the
California law analysis may proceed.
1. Federal Authority
(a) The Fifth Amendment
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, government use of the
eminent domain power to take private property must be for some "public use". 137
The Constitution does not prohibit government takings of private property, "but
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power."1 38 For example, a taking
simply transferring property from one private party to another is often said to be
unconstitutional. 139  However, some scholars question this assertion since the
Takings Clause does not expressly proscribe takings for private use. 140
Disagreements between scholars continue, even with a few key cases attempting to
clarify the Court's interpretation of "public use."
(b) Case Law
Three Supreme Court decisions have somewhat clarified what qualifies as public
use and have indicated the Court's preference for the broad view of public "use" as
public "purpose."
i. The Berman and Midkiff Decisions
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parkerl41 regarding
condemnation proceedings initiated pursuant to legislation. Congress made a
132. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203, 205
(1977-1978) (citing 2A C. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 7.01[4]-7.02[2] (rev. 3d. ed. J. Sackman & P. Rohan
1976); see also EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 3 (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary
Massaron Ross eds., American Bar Association 2006) [hereinafter, KELO IN CONTEXT].
133. Berger, supra note 132.
134. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 491, 493-94 (2006).
135. Id.
136. Berger, supra note 132; see also KELO IN CONTEXT, supra note 132.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
138. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,314 (1987)).
139. Berger, supra note 132.
140. Id.
141. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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legislative determination that the substandard living conditions associated with
blighted areas in Washington D.C. were injurious to health and welfare. 142 Based on
this legislative determination, the government was able to administer "all means
necessary and appropriate" to eliminate such injurious conditions.143  To combat
substandard housing and blighted areas, 144 Congress passed the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945.145 The Act created the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency, responsible for planning and undertaking
neighborhood development programs.146 The Agency was also authorized to use
eminent domain power to seize property for the redevelopment of blighted areas. 147
Congress determined the acquisition of real property for redevelopment purposes
pursuant to a redevelopment plan constituted a public purpose, legitimizing the use
of eminent domain power.148
Although the Agency seized private residential property to implement its
redevelopment plan, the Agency also seized private commercial property. The
appellants, owners of a department store, contested the seizure arguing the property
was commercial rather than residential, ultimately managed by a private party rather
than a public agency, and redeveloped for private rather than public use. 149
Furthermore, the appellants contested the redevelopment plan's purpose itself,
arguing takings to improve aesthetics did not qualify as a public use.150
Relying on Congress' police power over the District of Columbia, the Court
ultimately disagreed with the appellants' contentions.15 1 The Court described the
legislature as the "main guardian of the public," to whom deference must be afforded
when determining whether the public use requirement has been met.152 The Court
elaborated, stating the judiciary has only an "extremely narrow" role in determining
whether using eminent domain was based on a public use. 153 Congress not only has
the authority to determine the public use but once it is determined, Congress has the
exclusive authority to determine the means of attaining that purpose, regardless of
whether the means entail eminent domain.154
The Court also disagreed with the appellants' position that because their
particular structure did not contribute to blight, it could not be seized in order to
142. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
143. Id.
144. Id
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1469-1469c (omitted).
146. Id
147. See Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 711 (D. D.C. 1953).
148. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954).
149. Id. at 31.
150. Id
151. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) ("The 'public use' requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of the sovereign's police power.")
152. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55. 66 (1925); see
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
153. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
154. Id at 33-34 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679 (1896)).
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prevent blight and provide low-cost housing. The Court relied on the government's
overall plan to redevelop the designated community rather than the individual takings
themselves,15 5 and decided since the redevelopment plan concerned the community
as a whole rather than the individual structures within that community, each taking
contributed to the overall success of the neighborhood development plan. 156 The
Court ultimately affirmed the lower court decision legitimizing the use of eminent
domain to seize real private property because a redevelopment plan to address blight
qualified as a public purpose.157
The Supreme Court extended the Berman reasoning in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff 58 The Court stated that, when the local legislature determines
that use of eminent domain is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,"
the compensated taking will likely be deemed constitutional.159 The Court reiterated
that the legislative, state or federal, determination of a public use must be given
deference.160 In Midkiff, the legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967, which
created a land condemnation proposal that transferred title in real property from
lessors and to the existing lessees in order to reduce concentration of land
ownership.16 1 The public purpose was a breakup of the state's oligopoly, which was
deemed a common use of the state's police powers.162 Because the Act was meant
"not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals but to attack certain
perceived evils of concentrated property ownership", 163 the Court was able to
conclude that the taking, although a transfer of property from one private party
directly to another, qualified as a public use.164
ii. The Kelo Decision
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City ofNew London,165 a case
that has become one of the leading authorities distinguishing public use from abuse
of eminent domain power. After being designated a "distressed municipality," the
city of New London attempted to implement an economic redevelopment plan to
prevent blight.166 The plan's purpose was to redevelop the Fort Trumball area to
stimulate economic activity and serve as a "catalyst to the area's rejuvenation."'167
The city council authorized New London Development Corporation, a private,
nonprofit organization, to help the city plan its economic development, to initiate
155. Id. at 34.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 36.
158. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
159. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 230.
160. Id. at 244.
161. See id. at 233.
162. See id. at 241-42; see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
163. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
164. See id.; see also Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
165. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
166. Id. at 473.
167. Id. at 473-75.
2013-14] 205
Journal ofLegislation
condemnation proceedings, and to take private property through eminent domain if
it was unable to negotiate a sale with the property owners. 168 Thereafter, the property
would be leased to private developers.169
The Supreme Court of Connecticut relied on state law and decided New
London's actions were constitutional.170  Based on Connecticut's municipal
development statute,171 the court considered the taking to be based on a public
purpose because it was part of a public use economic development project.172 The
court also took into consideration that, despite the relative lack of blight in New
London,173 the State approved of the development plan.174
Ultimately, in a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the use of
eminent domain to condemn private property pursuant to an economic development
plan qualifies as a constitutional taking. 175  Considering the purpose of New
London's revitalization plan itself, the Supreme Court concluded the implementation
was for "public use," since the plan did not limit its benefit to a "particular class of
identifiable individuals." 76 The Court also denounced any express requirements that
condemned property be used for the general public.'7 7  Essentially, the Court
dismissed the narrow definition of "public use" for practicality's sake.178  The
Supreme Court preferred the broad view of public use, and determined New
London's development plan encompassed a "public purpose," and therefore a public
use. 179 However, some justices were not persuaded.
Four justices deemed New London's use of eminent domain unconstitutional.
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas jointly argued the Court had
misinterpreted the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause. 80 Justice O'Connor's
dissent, with which all dissenting justices joined, argued the majority's decision
"effectively delete[d] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment" by concluding that all private property can be taken and transferred to
another as long as the property may be used in a way the legislature believes is more
beneficial to the public.' 8 ' Justice O'Connor then distinguished this case from the
Berman and Midkiff decisions, emphasizing the properties' precondemnation use in
those cases "inflicted affirmative harm on society" and the legislative body
168. Id.
169. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509-10 (Conn. 2004).
170. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
171. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-186 (West 2012) (Chapter 132).
172. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476.
173. Id at 475.
174. Id at 473-74.
175. Id at 489-90.
176. Id. at 478.
177. Id. at 479.
178. See id. (stating the "use by the public" test would be difficult to administer due to potential
inconsistencies or complexities in determining how much public use is sufficient); see also Berger, supra note
132 at 205.
179. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
180. Id at 494 (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting).
181. Id at 494 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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determined condemnation was necessary to eliminate that harm.182  Here, the
legislature did not present a claim that the property caused any harm on society, but
that there was a predicted secondary public benefit to the new use.183 However, as
Justice O'Connor stated, nearly any lawful use of private property can result in some
incidental public benefit.184 With this standard, she argued, the legislature can seize
any property currently used for ordinary private use only to transfer it to another
private party for a new, ordinary private use. 185
Further, in Justice Thomas' dissent, he refuted the Court's broad interpretation
by concentrating on the text of the Constitution.186 He argued the word "use" should
be interpreted akin to "employ" instead of simply a purpose, as "use" is interpreted
in other parts of the Constitution. Moreover, Justice Thomas argued the Public
Use Clause is a limitation on the Takings Clause that must be given significance;
otherwise, it would be considered surplus.'8 8 Further, Justice Thomas asserted if the
Public Use Clause were not interpreted as a limitation, the Takings Clause would be
read as giving the government the right to take property for private or public use, but
only requiring just compensation when asserting the right for a public use.' 89 Justice
Thomas also argued that if economic development of this type may qualify as a
"public use," takings could be constitutional based on "any conceivable [public]
benefit from the taking." 90 In light of these decisions, federal case law suggests that
economic development plans may qualify as a constitutional taking; however,
California law places additional limitations on the state's eminent domain authority.
2. California Law
(a) Article 1, Section 19
California's constitution emulates the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause, which
reads, "private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when
just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into
court for, the owner".191 In accordance with a state's right to impose stricter rules on
its citizens, the California Constitution imposes additional limiting clauses on local
government use of eminent domain as compared to the federal government.192
182. Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501 (2005)(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 505-23 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
187. Id. at 509 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing Article 1 § 8 of the Constitution) (where "use" means
"employed to raise and support Armies").
188. Id. at 508 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect")).
189. Justice Thomas argued the Fifth Amendment would not be logically written had the Public Use Clause
not limited the Takings Clause, thus disregarding any requirement for just compensation for takings of private
property for private use but not public use. See id.
190. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005)(Thomas, J. dissenting).
191. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19(a) (amended 2008) (emphasis added).
192. Id.; supra Part III.B.i.
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(b) The Eminent Domain Law
In 1975, California's legislature passed the Eminent Domain Law,193 limiting the
exercise of eminent domain power.194 Its first general limitation relates to public use:
the government may only use eminent domain to acquire property for public use. 195
Yet, the direct transfer of private property to another private party may still qualify
as a constitutional taking. 196 The state courts must also give deference to the state
legislature's interpretation of what is considered a "public use" unless the purpose is
"demonstrably pretextual." 9 7  Therefore, statutory authorization to use eminent
domain is "deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature that such use... is a public
use."l98 The courts must afford deference to the legislature's determinations, but
may exercise a narrow scope of review regarding public use.199 For example,
deference is not required in cases such as when the supposed public use is clearly
pretextual of private benefits. The courts, then, have the final say and simple
legislative action would not automatically deem the public use sufficient for a
constitutional taking.200
i. The Community Redevelopment Law
The Eminent Domain Law imposes restrictions on government takings, even for
established public uses,201 such as economic redevelopment. 202  Redevelopment
agencies 203 could condemn property on behalf of a retailer or revenue generator to
stimulate a blighted area pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Law,204 which
aims to assist local governments in eliminating blight.205  However, the mere
193. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010, .020 (West 2013).
194. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ch. 1.
195. CIV. PROC. § 1240.010.
196. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S.
700, 707 (1923).
197. CIV. PROC. § 1240.010; 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
198. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129
199. See id. (public use is not established as a matter of law simply through statutory action).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Civ. PROC. § 1240.030 (imposing three requirements be met prior to condemnation: (a)
public interest and necessity require the proposed project; (b) the project is conducted in a way that imposes
"the greatest public good with the least personal injury"; (c) property sought is required to implement the
project).
202. See In Re Redev. Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 71 (1964) (clearance of blighted areas and
redevelopment ofthose areas are public uses); Community Redevelopment Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 33030-33031 (West 2013); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954).
203. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 33100-33142 (Agencies created pursuant to the Community Redevelopment
Law authorized to create and help implement redevelopment plans for blighted areas).
204. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 33342, 91.
205. See, e.g., Redevelopment Dissolution, LACOUNTY.GOV,
http://redevelopmentdissolution.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/rdd?1dmy&page=dept.rdd.home.detail.hidden&urile
=wcm%3Apath%3Allacounty+content/lacounty+site/home/redevelopment+dissolution/rdd+homethome+ink
s+of+interests/rd-history+of+redevelopment+in+califomia (last visited July 31, 2013).
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prevention of future blight does not qualify as a public use.206 Therefore, even though
redevelopment is an established public use, takings for such redevelopment with the
goal of preventing future blight are unconstitutional.
In addition to prohibiting use of eminent domain to prevent future blight, the
amended Community Redevelopment Law207 limited the definition for "blight"208
and increased oversight on redevelopment activities. 209  In 2006, the California
legislature passed the Community Redevelopment Law Reform Act to "restrict the
statutory definition of blight" and "to require better documentation of local officials'
findings regarding the conditions of blight.210 The amendment defined blight as a
predominantly urbanized area with conditions so substantial as to prohibit the proper
utilization of the area and to cause serious physical and economic harm to that area.211
A blighted area must also be characterized by one of the following: conditions unsafe
or unhealthy for people to work or live, conditions inhibiting proper use of buildings
or lots, "adjacent or nearby incompatible land uses" that prevent development, or the
existence of subdivided lots in multiple ownership that are prevented from physical
development without redevelopment programs.212 Although redevelopment
purposes could conceivably be associated with any neighborhood or municipality,
the Community Redevelopment Law limited condemnation pursuant to
redevelopment programs to blighted areas only. 213
As of 2012 eminent domain may not be used in California for redevelopment
purposes at all.214 As part of the Budget Act of 2011, and to "protect funding for
core public services at the local level",215 Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly
Bills X1 26, eliminating redevelopment agencies, and X1 27, allowing voluntary
redevelopment programs. 216 Thereafter, the California Supreme Court declared
voluntary redevelopment programs unconstitutional217 and redevelopment agencies
dissolved in early 2012.218 Since the Community Redevelopment Law restricts
condemnation for redevelopment purposes to blighted areas and government219 and
206. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-31 (requiring a valid public use for the plan and
proof that the property was blighted at the time of its attempted taking); HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 33000-33855.
207. HEALTH & SAFETY § 33000-33855.
208. HEALTH & SAFETY § 33030(b)(1) (A blighted area is a predominantly urbanized area, underutilizing
to the point of such a "serious physical and economic burden on the community that [it] cannot reasonably be
expected to be reversed . .. without redevelopment.").
209. S.B. 1206, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (amending HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 33328.7, 33378,
33500, and 33501, and adding §§ 33328.1, 33360.5, 33451.5, 33501.1, 33501.2, 33501.3, and 33501.7).
210. Id.at§l(e).
211. S.B. 1206, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 33030(b)(1)).
212. Id. (amending HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 33030(b)(2) & 33031(a)).
213. Id.
214. Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE WEBSITE
http://www.dof.ca.gov/redevelopment/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
215. Id.
216. KEVIN H. BROGAN, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: FIFTY STATE SURVEY 66 (William G. Blake ed.,
2012).
217. California Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
218. Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, supra note 214.
219. Legislative bodies may also elect to administer the powers granted to an agency pursuant to the
Community Redevelopment Law. HEALTH & SAFETY § 33003.
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volunteer redevelopment agencies have been eliminated, condemnation pursuant to
redevelopment programs is no longer possible. Therefore, even condemnation for a
public purpose such as redevelopment is not permitted in California.
Through sufficient legislative action, practically anyone can exercise eminent
domain power. Under the Eminent Domain Law, municipalities and private persons
must have an express right to condemn private property. 220  Legislation has
authorized state agencies221 as well as city,222 county,223 and school district 224
officials to use eminent domain power, giving these entities the ability to seize
property necessary to exercise their powers or functions.225 Although the Eminent
Domain Law explicitly allows certain entities to utilize the power of
condemnation,226 those entities do not automatically have that right. The right to use
eminent domain power must be "found in some statute of the state, and that such right
must be expressly given, or arise by necessary implication from powers expressly
given."227 The restriction on the right to use eminent domain along with a qualified
public use, are contingent on the legislature.228 The legislature may also permit a
private entity229 or person230 to condemn property for public use, or the reasonable
prospect of use within a reasonable time.231 However, the authorized parties are still
required to provide just compensation for the taking regardless of qualified public
purposes.
C. "Just Compensation"
For a constitutional use of eminent domain power, California requires the taking
of "property" and that property be utilized for a "public use." The California
constitution also imposes a third requirement ofjust compensation for the condemned
property and reads, "Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and
only whenjust compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid
to, or into court for, the owner."232 Unlike public use, verification of just
compensation is exclusively a judicial function.233 The goal of the clause is fairness,
220. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.020 (West 2013).
221. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15853 (West 2013); CIV. PROC. § 1240.020.
222. Gov'T § 37350.5; CIv. PROC. § 1240.020.
223. Gov'T § 2530.5; Civ. PROC. § 1240.020.
224. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1047 (West 2013); CIv. PROC. § 1240.020.
225. CIV. PROC. §1238 (repealed 1975) (Legislative Committee Comment-Senate) (repealed because the
Eminent Domain Law preserves these authorities' eminent domain power).
226. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
227. See Marin Cnty. v. Superior Court of Marin Cnty., 53 Cal. 2d 633, 636 (1960) (referencing S. Pac. R.
Co. v. S. Cal. Ry. Co., Ill Cal. 221, 227 (1896)).
228. See supra notes 155-57, 197-99 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., People v. Oken, 324 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
230. Civ. PROC. § 1235.160 (A "person" can mean "any public entity, individual, association, organization,
partnership, trust, limited liability company, or corporation.").
231. See CIv. PROC. § 1240.020 (restricting eminent domain power to only those legislatively authorized);
see, e.g., Woodland Sch. Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n, 344 P.2d 326, 327 (1959).
232. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19(a)(emphasis added).
233. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) (citing Monongahela Nay.
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893)); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306
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equity, efficiency, and making the condemnee whole after the taking.234 Pursuant to
this goal, judges have established their own standard for evaluating just
compensation, traditionally requiring fair market value of the property.235
In California, a property's fair market value is property's highest price on the
date of valuation that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.236  This
assessment takes into account the property's "highest and best use,"237 the highest
and "most profitable use to which the property might be put in the reasonably near
future."238 For property with no relevant, comparable market, the value is determined
by "any method of valuation that is just and equitable." 239 Fact-finders determining
fair market value may consider the same factors a knowledgeable, nongovernmental
buyer would consider in purchasing the property for private use.240
While fair market value is the general standard when determining just
compensation for a condemned property, sometimes an even higher valuation is
required.241 Judge-made law requires at least fair market value be awarded; however,
legislatures are able to provide additional compensation. 242 The legislative purpose
for its higher standard is to protect not only the landowner but also the public, seeking
to limit the public's liability to losses attributed to the taking.243 California's concept
of just compensation is based on what the property owner has lost,244 seeking to
provide the "full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken," and bringing
the condemnee to a pecuniary position tantamount to his position had the taking never
occurred.245 The measure of just compensation also includes "all damages that
[would] reasonably accrue from the taking." 246
Additionally, California's constitution explicitly requires jury determination for
just compensation. The constitution requires the condemning party to provide just
compensation "ascertained by a jury unless waived."247  Therefore, unless the
(1923) (holding Congress cannot constitutionally set just compensation).
234. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950) (equating the word "just"
to ideas of "fairness" and "equity"); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (condemnees must be
put in the same financial position they would have been had they kept their property).
235. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
236. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(a) (West 2013).
237. City of San Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos P'ship, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 119 (Ct. App. 2003).
238. City of San Diego v. Neumann, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 483 (1993) (citation omitted).
239. Civ. PROC. § 1263.320(b).
240. See City of Fremont v. Fisher, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54,63 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted); Cnty. of San
Diego v. Rancho Vista Del Mar, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 686 (Ct. App. 1993).
241. Civ. PROC. § 1263.310 (comments); see, e.g., Ventura Cnty. Floor Control Dist. v. Campbell, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 725, 730 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted).
242. See Joslin Mfg. Co, v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923) (legislatures are able to provide
compensation above the minimum set by just compensation).
243. See, e.g., Emeryville Redev, v. Harcros Pigments, Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 19 (Ct. App. 2002).
244. See, e.g., Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 483 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1971).
245. City of San Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos P'ship, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 119 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted).
246. Ellena v. State, 138 Cal. Rptr. 110, 119-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (citation omitted).
247. CAL. CONST. art. I § 19(a) (emphasis added).
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condemnee and state248 waive this right, a jury is required to determine just
compensation before administering any taking.249 At trial, the jury would consider
the same factors a buyer would consider when determining fair market value, as if
the jury was considering purchasing the property.250 Jury determination is limited to
the amount of compensation, however, and the court determines any other question
of fact. 251
V. SHOULD MRP's PROPOSAL BE IMPLEMENTED?
Proponents and opponents of the proposal agree on at least one thing: something
needs to be done to prevent the housing crisis from getting worse. The issue is which
avenue to take towards that common goal. Legality, procedural, efficiency, and
political concerns must be considered. Careful consideration of these concerns
should persuade municipalities to reject MRP's proposal.
A. Lack of a Public Use
Despite the need for some kind of active response to the housing crisis,
opponents have vigorously questioned the proposal's constitutionality. 252 They have
remained unconvinced notwithstanding MRP's assurance that its proposal is within
the confines of the U.S. Constitution and California law. At present, the proposal is
impermissible under federal as well as state eminent domain law.
For decades, the United States Supreme Court has stated that public use is
"coterminous with the.. . police powers" and has given the legislature deference in
its determination of public use.253 In Kelo, the Court emphasized the redevelopment
plan as a whole and the plan's purpose, rather than the purpose of each individual
taking.254 The Court concluded that, the taking was constitutional based the taking's
necessity as part of a comprehensive plan to redevelop the area. However, with
regard to MRP's proposal, there is no comprehensive plan authorized by the state
legislature. Because no plan to redevelop the immediate area has been authorized by
the legislature no redevelopment plan can be said to exist for public use determination
purposes. The proposal is the takings themselves. MRP's proposal relinquishes any
and all control of the property after restructuring the loans; thereafter, allowing the
homeowners to use the money they previously used on their mortgage however they
248. See United States v. 21 Acres of Land, More or Less, 61 F.Supp. 268, 274 (S.D.Cal. 1945) (both the
state and property owner are entitled to jury trial).
249. See, e.g., City of Carlsbad v. Rudvalis, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 200 (Ct. App. 2003) (the question of
amount of compensation goes to the jury); Weber v. Bd. of Supervisors of the Cnty. of Santa Clara, 59 Cal. 265,
266 (1881); Trahern v. Bd. of Supervisors of San Joaquin Valley, 59 Cal. 320, 320-21 (1881).
250. City of Fremont v. Fisher, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 63 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
251. See, e.g., Redev. Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc., 185 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citation omitted).
252. See, e.g., Jann Swanson, Eminent Domain Calls Down Thunder From FHFA, MORTGAGE NEWS
DAILY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/08092013_eminent-domain.asp.
253. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (citation omitted); see also Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992).
254. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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wish. The public purpose behind MRP's proposal is the expectation that those
homeowners will spend their windfalls and stimulate the economy.255 Again, this is
only an assumption because the proposal allows the homeowners to save the money
and not use it at all.
Further, the takings in Kelo only served as the first step of an overall plan
approved by the legislature 256 whereas MRP's proposal has no comprehensive plan.
This distinction could force judges to evaluate each individual taking, meaning the
judges would need to test each taking for a qualified public purpose. MRP's
supposed purpose is also to reduce the risk of foreclosures by restructuring current
mortgages. However, MRP originally disqualified homeowners who were behind on
mortgage payments. Even though MRP revised its plan to include homeowners who
have defaulted on payments, including any mortgages that are up-to-date would not
advance MRP's goal to reduce the risk of foreclosures since those mortgages already
carry significantly less risk of foreclosure. Additionally, as there is no
comprehensive plan, review of each individual taking would be necessary. At the
very least, the judge could consider the individual takings of up-to-date mortgages as
inhibiting the stated public purpose since those takings prohibit restructuring of loans
much more likely of default. However, the purpose of each taking, especially of up-
to-date mortgages, would not help to reduce the risk of foreclosures thus nullifying
MRP's supposed public purpose. Standing alone, MRP's takings would lack public
purpose because the individual takings of up-to-date mortgages inhibit the reduction
in risk of foreclosure and they are not a necessary part of an overall plan to revitalize
the local economy.257 Further, the Eminent Domain Law requires that projects
necessitating a taking must be "planned or located in the manner that will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."258 Targeting
underwater mortgages rather than foreclosures and including up-to-date mortgages
instead of exclusively taking delinquent mortgages would not serve the greatest
public good.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Midkiff authorized the transfer of property
from one private party to another because the benefit was not directed to a particular
class of identifiable individuals. 259 MRP's proposal would target private persons
themselves, disqualifying the purpose of preventing foreclosures with the hope of
revitalizing the economy as public use. The mortgagors would receive a windfall
from their restructured mortgages with no restriction on how their income260 should
be utilized. MRP and its investors are another particular class of identifiable
255. Matthew C. Klein, California Mortgage Grabs Are a Terrible Idea, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2013,
11:10 AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-17/california-mortgage-grabs-are-a-
terrible-idea.html.
256. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-75 (condemned property was necessary for redevelopment of the immediate
area, and to fulfill the redevelopment plan's requirements).
257. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 19(b).
258. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030.
259. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
260. The IRS considers debt cancellation, such as after a loan is restructured, as taxable income. 26
U.S.C.A. § 108; The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act and Debt Cancellation, IRS (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/The-Mortgage-Forgiveness-Debt-Relief-Act-and-Debt-Cancellation-.
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individuals who will profit from this proposal. MRP is a venture-capitalist firm
projecting up to 20% profits for its investors.261 The high profit potential for the
homeowners, MRP, and MRP's investors, coupled with of a comprehensive plan to
promote economic stimulation demonstrates that MRP's supposed public purpose is
only pretext for private benefits for identifiable individuals.
As compared to federal authority, California law imposes a stricter standard for
what satisfies the public use requirement. Through its Eminent Domain Law,262 the
legislature restricted eminent domain use so much that it can be prohibited in even
decidedly troubled communities, such as blighted areas characterized by serious
physical and economic burden, dilapidation, and danger of unhealthy conditions. 263
Likewise, the law proscribes condemnation to prevent future blight.264 The fact that
the legislature sought to restrict the use of eminent domain in circumstances as
serious as these may indicate its reluctance to permit takings in almost any
circumstance. The purpose of MRP's proposal is to prevent foreclosures265 and the
negative effects concentrated foreclosures have on communities. 266 This purpose is
akin to the prevention of future blight, rather than addressing existing blight,
especially since the proposal targets underwater mortgages rather than foreclosures.
Further, Richmond has not been deemed a blighted area. Since the Eminent Domain
Law prohibits condemnation to prevent future blight, the law would also likely
prohibit condemnation pursuant to MRP's proposal.
Allowing MRP and Richmond to implement their plan would be a slippery slope
towards qualifying any residual public benefit as a valid actual purpose for eminent
domain use. When considering redevelopment plans, and recognizing the ease of
manufacturing "conceivable [public] benefit[s]" for plans such as these,267 the
Supreme Court emphasized the need to evaluate the actual purpose behind each
plan.268 MRP claims its actual purpose for the proposal is to mitigate the amount of
foreclosures as well as help mortgagees stay in their homes.269 Opponents of the plan
could argue the plan's actual purpose is merely a private benefit. MRP, a venture-
capital firm, is unapologetically motivated by profits270 and has induced private
investors with potential profits of up to twenty percent for their participation.271
Additionally, MRP's original proposal only targeted those who were up-to-date on
their payments, disqualifying delinquent mortgagees entirely.272 MRP claimed its
proposal would target those in serious danger of foreclosure, however the public
261. Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
262. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010, .020 (West 2013).
263. Id.
264. See supra note 206.
265. See FAQs, supra note 82.
266. See supra notes 24-29.
267. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
268. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
269. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS WEBSITE, supra note 74; see also Centerfor American Progress,
supra note 84.
270. Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
271. Angelides to lead, supra note 73.
272. Griffin, supra note 32; see also Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
214 [Vol. 40:1
Eminent Domain: Richmond, California's Illusory Solution
purpose of preventing foreclosures would more reasonably support targeting
homeowners unable to meet their mortgage payments. Therefore, allowing a plan
such as MRP's would allow the government to use an illusory veil of practically any
consequential public purpose to mask actual purposes of private benefit.
B. Lack ofJust Compensation
Another matter of contention is the proposal's mode of compensation. The court
determines whether the just compensation requirement is met273 and precedent
requires "fair market value" of the taken property. 274 Much like public use, state
legislatures are free to establish higher standards of just compensation than imposed
by federal law and because there has been no endorsement by the CA legislature, they
have not had the opportunity to impose a higher valuation requirement. 275
In its plan with Richmond, MRP proposes compensating condemnees with
eighty percent of the associated home's fair market value,276 while it originally
proposed compensation of the fair market value of the loan.277 Eighty percent of the
fair market value of the collateral cannot qualify as just compensation. If the
mortgagors continues to make payments and fulfills their obligations, the mortgagee
would receive the full value of the originally contracted loan. If the mortgagor
defaults, the mortgagee would receive the collateral, which would provide the fair
market value of the collateral. Although MRP is unclear of the reasoning for
decreasing compensation to eighty percent of the collateral's fair market value, the
full fair market value of the collateral would not suffice. Just compensation
determinations must consider the property's highest and "most profitable use" 278 as
well as its "full and perfect equivalent in money." 279
Since the full and perfect equivalent of the loan would reflect the full payment
of the loan or the full fair market value of the collateral, eighty percent of the
collateral's fair market value is not just compensation for the takings.
Under California law, even the fair market value of the associated homes may
not reflect the true value of the loans. California requires consideration of the
condemnees' position had the taking not occurred 280 as well as any damages that
would reasonably ensue from the taking.281  In these terms, damages could
reasonably mean the damages from a breach of contract. Condemnees could sue the
273. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) (citing Monongahela Nay.
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893)); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306
(1923) (holding Congress cannot constitutionally set just compensation).
274. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
275. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ch. 1; see Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262
U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923).
276. McDill, supra note 38.
277. See FAQs, supra note 82.
278. See supra notes 238.
279. City of San Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos P'ship, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 119 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted).
280. Id.
281. Ellena v. State, 138 Cal. Rptr. 110, 119-20 (Ct. App. 1977).
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homeowners for the difference between the originally contracted loan and the amount
ultimately compensated for the taking. MRP has argued against this contention,
referring to Midkffand the Court's assertion that the "Contract Clause has never been
thought to protect against the exercise of the power of eminent domain," 282 but
Midkiff was not subject to California law and its requirement to consider potential
damages did not apply. 283
Even assuming MRP did not have to consider damages from breach of contract
into their just compensation assessments, alternative California laws requiring
consideration of the property's "highest price" 284 and "most profitable use" 285 would
be enough to demonstrate fair market value's insufficiency for just compensation.
The highest price or most profitable use for a contract would be the full value of the
contract if the mortgagors were to fulfill their obligations, especially regarding cases
where the mortgagors are up-to-date on their payments. Under California law, fair
market value of the home may arguably be the loan's least profitable value. It is
much more likely that up-to-date mortgagors would ultimately pay the full value of
the contract had the taking not occurred. There is approximately a two-year gap
between the first missed mortgage payment and repossession, 286 and these
mortgagors have yet to miss a payment on their loans. During those two years, many
things can happen to the mortgagors to either better or worsen their financial situation
and his ability to continue making payments. Because the proposal's selection
process is rather vague, it is difficult to determine whether the mortgagees would
have ever missed any payments. 287 Thus, there is a possibility that but for the taking
the loan servicer would have received the full value of the contract, the originally
contracted value. Although MRP aims to target those mortgagors in serious danger
of defaulting, whether they actually would have is indeterminable. In calculating just
compensation, the jury would be required to consider contract fulfillment in its
evaluation of the most profitable use of the property, arguably leaving anything less
than the full value of the mortgage as unjust compensation.
MRP argues bondholders are not entitled to the full value of the mortgages
because they have already suffered the loss since the value of the mortgage has
282. FAQs, supra note 82.
283. California law does, however, allow for deficiencyjudgments if the fair market value of the foreclosed
home is less than the loan's outstanding balance. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(a). Mortgagees may be able to
sue for lost funds based on the home fair market value, but that possibility is beyond the scope of this Note. If
such deficiency judgments were allowed, the judgments would likely remove all incentives to establish MRP's
proposal in the first place, depending on who is required to pay such judgments.
284. Eminent Domain Law, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(a) (West 2013); Rancho Penasquitos, 130
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
285. City of San Diego v. Neumann, 863 P.2d 725, 728 (Cal. 1993).
286. See Les Christie, Foreclosure free ride: 3 years, no payment, CNN (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/28/realestate/foreclosure/index.htm (nationwide average time between first
defaulted payment and foreclosure is 674 days according to LPS Applied Analytics); see also Les Christie,
Flood of foreclosures to hit the housing market, CNN (Apr. 13, 2012)
http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/13/realestate/foreclosures/index.htm (nationwide average time between first
defaulted payment and foreclosure is 370 days in the first quarter according to RealtyTrac).
287. See FAQs, supra note 82; see also Center for American Progress, supra note 84 (Steven Gluckstern,
Chairman for MRP, does not give details on the selection process for eligible mortgages).
216 [Vol. 40:1
Eminent Domain: Richmond, California's Illusory Solution
decreased due to the reduction in home values.288 The condemnees, however, have
contracted for a specific loan amount and that amount remains constant independent
of the present value of the loan's collateral. The loan servicers do not suffer a loss,
as MRP argues, until forced to foreclose the homes.289 Again, since the proposal also
targets those current on their payments, the servicers owning the up-to-date
mortgages have yet to suffer a loss and it is unclear if they ever will.
C. Bad Public Policy
Separate from legality concerns, the proposal itself has come into contention.
From its inception, opponents have criticized the proposal for being poor public
policy.290 For example, Representative John Campbell of California deplores the
proposal, and has gone as far as introducing legislation twice 291 in order to prohibit
this type of eminent domain use. 292  Representative Campbell's opposition stems
from his argument that the proposal's impact on the housing market may be opposite
of its professed intent,29 3 hypothesizing the proposal would "chill investment in the
mortgage market." 294 Banking and other trade groups have echoed these arguments,
fearing the proposal will deplete the availability of credit for future mortgages.29 5
The Securities Industry and Finance Markets Association has already planned to
prohibit loans from areas using eminent domain, 296 and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency has threatened to take action against the proposal.297 Supporters do not
agree, claiming the reduction in principal for qualified mortgages would stimulate
the economy and energize the housing market.298 Steven Gluckstern asserts that not
only would the reduction stimulate the economy, it is the only way the housing
288. Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
289. Since the loans are underwater, foreclosing the home will not make up for the remaining balance of
the originally contracted loan. At this point, the mortgage holders would suffer a loss from the decreased value
of the home depending on the possibility for deficiency judgments.
290. For example, the Federal Housing Finance Agency has opposed the proposal because of potential risks
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the taxpayer-supported firms working under conservatorship to support the
housing market. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47652 (Aug. 6,2012).
Tom Deutsch, Executive Director of American Securitization Forum, argues the proposal would essentially act
as a reward for bad behavior. Jim Carr, Senior Policy Fellow from Opportunity Agenda, argued against the
proposal because it ignores those who really need the help, i.e. those defaulting on their loan payments. Center
for American Progress, supra note 84.
291. H.R. 2733, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); H.R. 6397, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
292. Alan Zibel, Eminent Domain Furor Hits Capitol Hill, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/09/13/eminent-domain-furor-hits-capitol-hill/.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Jim Kim, FHFA opposes eminent domain plan, FIERCE FINANCE (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.fiercefinance.com/story/fhfa-opposes-eminent-domain-plan/2012-08-14.
296. Id; Zibel, supra note 292; Katya Wachtel, Calif official urges AG Holder to stop eminent domain
'threats', REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLIE8KA4CX20120910
(SIFMA warning of potentially scaring away future mortgage financers).
297. See Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47652; see also Zibel,
supra note 292.
298. Berm Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched By Other Struggling
Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-
domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html?view=print&comm ref-false.
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market may be stimulated.299 His assertion, however, has not convinced these
opponents, nor has it mitigated other concerns.
The plan is also likely to diminish municipal resources. California's constitution
requires a jury to determine just compensation prior to each taking, unless waived.300
Due to California's requirement that just compensation be based on the highest and
most profitable use of the property, 301 the loan servicers would not likely waive this
right because they would probably contest any offered amount lower than the full
value of the contract. Each mortgage will potentially have different values since
calculations are also based on various factors such as the home's neighborhood,
amenities, delinquency history, and damages from the taking itself.302 Due to the
different factors, each evaluation would require special attention, and calling for a
jury for each of hundreds of takings would be impractical, costly for local
municipalities, and burdensome to the judicial system.
Opponents may also argue the proposal hinders free enterprise and contractual
protections. The proposal would void otherwise valid contracts between willing
competent parties, and the parties in a significant portion of these contracts would in
fact be fulfilling their contractual obligations. Proponents may argue external help is
necessary in order to refinance and stabilize these mortgagees; however, the taking
and voiding of the original contracts would disregard freedom to contract and would
result in future reluctance to enter into such contracts, at least for the lenders.
Additionally, the proposal makes no effort to disqualify mortgagors whose loans
are delinquent or in danger of foreclosure based on pure irresponsibility. For
example, the proposal does not specifically favor those parties who suffered financial
hardship from debilitating injury or layoffs stemming from the Great Recession.
Potentially irresponsible contract signers would simply be released from liability for
their delinquency while the lenders are forced to pay for it, despite fulfilling their
obligations. Moreover, funds used for refinancing irresponsible borrowers'
mortgages are funds that could have helped a responsible, yet badly injured borrower
who really deserves government assistance.
Proponents may also argue that the mortgage crisis was the banks' fault in the
first place, and sympathy for the lenders' contractual losses is undeserved. But quid-
pro-quo cannot be the standard for resolution and should not be the message the
government seeks to convey.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite what seems to be a calamitous need for a solution to the housing crisis,
MRP's proposal to condemn underwater mortgages to prevent foreclosures is the not
299. See, e.g., Al Yoon, New Roadblock for Eminent Domain Bid: Housing Regulator, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2012/08/08/new-roadblock-for-eminent-domain-
bid-housing-regulator/; see also Center for American Progress, supra note 84.
300. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 19 cl. (a).
301. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Neumann, 863 P.2d 725, 728 (Cal. 1993).
302. See City of Fremont v. Fisher, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 62 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Cnty. of San Diego v.
Rancho Vista Del Mar, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 686 (Ct. App. 1993).
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answer. Federal and California law prohibit this proposal,303 but its national
implications go beyond legality concerns. This proposal would widen the scope of
one of the most intrusive government powers, a power that should not be taken
lightly. The Fifth Amendment exemplifies the importance of protecting a citizen's
right to private property, "[piroperty [that] must be secured, or liberty cannot
exist."304 This type of proposal transfers private property from one private party to
another. Allowing this type of forcible acquisition may result in the diminished
protection of property, ignoring private parties' legitimate contractual choices for the
mere possibility of public gain. Moreover, the proposal's credible benefits are only
to identifiable private third parties. This should not qualify as a public use, and the
reduced value of a valid contract should not qualify as just compensation.
Legitimizing this proposal would lead the way toward legitimizing takings based on
just about any conceivable public benefit. Although the housing crisis is a problem
that must be addressed, municipalities throughout the country should forego
Richmond and MRP's proposal.
303. Although some restrictions of eminent domain use mentioned in this Note are specific to California
authority, the housing crisis is a national concern and countless municipalities throughout the country are
considering proposals similar to Richmond's. Municipalities outside California should use the research and
arguments in this Note to compare and contrast their controlling statutory and constitutional language, and to
discover which restrictions may or may not apply.
304. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States 35 (1961)(quoting John Adams).
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